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THE GEORGE A. LEET BUSINESS
LAW SYMPOSIUM:
THE ROLE OF LAWYERS IN
STRATEGIC ALLIANCES
INTRODUCTION
The rapid proliferation of strategic alliances - such as joint
ventures, dealerships, franchises, and licenses - is transforming the
way the world does business. Alliances have become indispensable in many industries due to globalization and to the acceleration
of technological change. To flourish in these industries a firm
must access foreign markets and develop new technologies quicker
than it is capable of on its own; it must gain the resources of another firm through a business alliance. Those resources may be
financial or in the form of expertise, as in technology or marketing.
The growth of alliances is also spurred by two new forces that
pose a dilemma for firms. One is pressure to concentrate on a
firm's core competencies and shed activities where competitors
have greater expertise. We have learned that conglomeration is
bad and focus is good. The other trend is to insist that firms not
stand pat but constantly seek new sources of profit. To satisfy
these seemingly incompatible demands, firms often try to maintain
their focus while expanding their activities by partnering with
firms that have complementary strengths. In the past, suppliers
and customers dealt through ordinary contracts, but alliances better
allow firms to speed innovation while maintaining flexibility to
adapt to rapidly fluctuating market conditions.
Alliances are also transforming the work of business lawyers.
In alliances the parties must trust and cooperate with each other
much more than in the financings and acquisitions that are the traditional staples of corporate practice. As a consequence, in negotiating and drafting contracts for alliances lawyers must not only
master a new set of substantive terms but assume a new demeanor,
one that fosters such trust and cooperation.
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Unfortunately, legal academia has almost completely ignored
this trend. Finance and business authors have generated reams of
books and articles poring over the theoretical and practical issues
of alliances, but in law the literature comprises little more than the
proceedings of a few continuing legal education programs. The
probable reasons for this oversight are illuminating. Traditionally,
firms acquire goods and services in one of two ways: they either
"make" them within the firm or "buy" them in market
purchase
contracts. In legal academia, the former is covered in business
associations; the latter, in contracts. Strategic alliances do not fit
into either established category and seem to be falling between the
cracks.
George A. Leet endowed the Business Law Symposium to
tackle new issues and to cultivate imaginative analyses and solutions; therefore, this Symposium marks the first serious effort by
legal academia to study strategic alliances. Since alliances differ
from other business transactions fundamentally and not merely in
technical details, any serious examination of alliances must incorporate several perspectives. One of these is a traditional legal
analysis of the consequences of choosing a particular form of
business organization (such as the joint venture) and of various
contract terms. Another is a corporate finance analysis that investigates how alliances allocate property rights and address agency
costs so as to maximize the parties' profit. Both these approaches
rely on insights from psychology and sociology regarding how
trust and cooperation are created and maintained so as to minimize
risk to both parties.
To this spectrum of disciplinary perspectives must be added
another set of perspectives, those of the various players in the
game. First there are the parties, whose interests vary depending
on their financial resources, the significance of the particular alliance within the firm, the inputs that they offer to the alliance, and
the benefits that they hope to reap from it. Then there are the lawyers, who may be outside or in-house counsel. Finally, there are
investment bankers, accountants, and others who advise the parties
or facilitate the transaction.
The speakers for this Symposium bring a wealth of experience
and represent a wide variety of these perspectives. Our first principal speaker, Stephen Fraidin, is a distinguished corporate lawyer
who has also taught in law schools and written extensively about
business transactions.1 His article focuses on the control issues in
' See Stephen Fraidin & Radu Lelutiu, Strategic Alliances and Corporate Control, 53
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 865 (2003).
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strategic alliances, especially where one partner in the alliance
makes an equity investment in the other. In some cases this investment is complemented by a right of the investing company to
acquire its partner. Alternatively, the investing company may
make a takeover bid for its partner. What contract terms are desirable to cover these possibilities? And what are the fiduciary duties
of the investing company to its partner?
The first commentator on Fraidin's article is another distinguished corporate lawyer and an alumna of our law school, Jeanne
2
Rickert, who explores three issues in strategic alliances. First,
trust and cooperation in an alliance depend heavily on what will
happen when the alliance terminates. The lawyers must help the
parties in negotiating the alliance to focus on that issue which, in
their desire to think positively and avoid conflict, they might prefer to ignore. Second, there is an inherent conflict of interest when
an officer, who owes allegiance to the partner who is her employer, also participates in the governance of the alliance, where
she owes duties to both partners. She notes that courts have not
resolved this conflict, so it behooves the parties to work it out by
contract. Third, non-competition clauses between partners can
raise sticky problems when one partner is acquired by a company
that competes with the other partner.
The second commentator on the morning panel is Dan Austin,
a prominent investment banker in mergers, acquisitions, and alliances. 3 He notes the potential problems when partners have different goals, like creating jobs on one side and maximizing profits
on the other. Next he discusses how detailed alliance agreements
should be arranged. Partners want to maintain flexibility to meet
unexpected circumstances and'to avoid haggling over contingencies that could undermine trust and cooperation, but a thoughtful,
thorough set of rules can enhance trust and cooperation.
Following the comments was a lively colloquy among the
panelists and the large audience, which included several experienced participants in business alliances. Among the issues discussed were the need for lengthier negotiations than in other deals
because the parties have to reach mutually acceptable terms; the
difficult role of lawyers and the need for business people to talk
without lawyers present; the desirability of arbitration and other

2

See Jeanne M. Rickert, Keep Your Eyes Open: Avoiding Unintended Consequences in

Joint Venture Relationships, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 897 (2003).
3 See Daniel F. Austin, A Businesspersons' Perspective Concerning Joint Ventures, 53
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905 (2003).

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:857

dispute resolution clauses; and the possible benefits of outside advisors.
The main speaker on the first afternoon program was Rachelle
Sampson, a finance and management scholar who also holds a law
degree.4 She begins by noting that an alliance can entail either
profit-sharing, perhaps through a separate entity (like a joint venture partnership or corporation), or a contract with stipulated consideration instead of profit-sharing. She then asks under what circumstances either of these is preferable to the other. One approach
by scholars to this issue focuses on the allocation of property
rights to induce the most efficient investments by the partners.
Another approach - transaction cost economics - focuses on protecting a partner who has made an investment from holdup by the
other party, who may refuse to cooperate after the investment has
been made.
In theory, an equity (or profit-sharing) alliance (like a joint
venture) is more suited for complex arrangements, where it is difficult to specify the rights and duties of the parties in advance, in
order to monitor the partners' compliance and to enforce the contract by proving a breach if one occurs. Equity joint ventures are
not always optimal, though. They are often too costly to set up
and operate in simpler transactions where a traditional contract
will suffice. Another determinant of alliance structure is whether
there are prior dealings between the parties or a social network
within an industry that reduce moral hazard problems so that
costly formal structures are not needed.
Professor Sampson measures this theory against her empirical
study of alliances. She gauged the complexity of a number of equity and non-equity alliances and then ascertained how many patents each alliance succeeded in obtaining. She finds that in complex alliances the equity joint venture outperforms the pure contract mode, but that in simpler alliances the opposite is true. In
short, practice confirms theory; structure matters.
She also looked at alliance successes as a function of prior alliance experience. She found that the more alliances you do, the
better you get at them; that recent experience is more valuable than
older experience; and that experience is most important for success
in equity joint ventures - i.e., alliances with highly uncertain activities. During the symposium colloquy, she also noted that firms
with wide experience in alliances have begun to institutionalize
their alliance design and management processes. She concludes
4 See Rachelle C. Sampson, The Role of Lawyers in Strategic Alliances, 53 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 909 (2003).
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that since structure matters and lawyers can play a critical role in
designing alliances structures, lawyers should not be excluded or
slighted in negotiating alliances.
The first commentator on Professor Sampson's presentation
was Professor Susan Helper,, an economist at our Weatherhead
School of Management who has, inter alia, closely studied supplier-customer relations in the automobile industry.5 She first
notes that factors that were omitted from Professor Sampson's
study, rather than choice of alliance structure, could account for
differences in there success - i.e., we cannot necessarily conclude
that alliances that obtained fewer patents chose the wrong structure. She also discusses how one or both partners may have other
goals than to maximize the number of patents obtained. For example, one partner may be primarily interested to learn more about
a product, industry, or market.
She discusses how a major purpose of an alliance may also be
to get acquainted with a partner with whom one may eventually
want a closer relationship. Accordingly, alliance partners typically
start with a small project and progress to larger, more complex
projects if their initial experiences are positive. In such cases, mutual trust accumulated over time may substitute for carefully
drafted contract provisions and control structures.
Finally, Professor Helper suggests that lawyers may play a
significant role in designing the proper incentives, like incentives
to encourage people to share information. Toward this end it may
be desirable to de-emphasize more traditional legal concerns, like
intellectual property rights.
The second commentator on Professor Sampson was Sanjiv
Kapur, a corporate lawyer with wide experience in international
alliances. 6 He noted that the terms of an alliance may be influenced by its purpose; e.g., whether it entails cross-border marketing as opposed to research and development. He also noted that
legal issues, like firm liability, fiduciary duties, and the need for a
domestic partner in a foreign market, influence choice of alliance
structure.
He then listed some potentially significant business considerations not previously mentioned. For example, some firms want an
alliance to be a separate entity in order to encourage the individuals participating in the alliance to identify with it and to be ex5 See Susan R. Helper, Governing Alliances: Advancing Knowledge and Controlling
Opportunism, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 929 (2003).
6 See Sanijv K. Kapur, Structuring and Negotiating International Joint Ventures: Anecdotal Evidence from a Large Law Firm Practice, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 937 (2003).

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:857

posed to a new culture. Accounting and tax considerations may
also play a role. He agreed with Professor Sampson that complexity weighs in favor of an equity joint venture structure.
Finally, Mr. Kapur discussed his experience with several deals
that either were never consummated or fell apart. In both contexts
he noted the importance of changing needs and circumstances. He
later noted that one kind of significant change is a change in the
personnel in one partner, since trust rests partly on personal contact. Further, he discusses how the facts regarding each deal are
unique, so that generalizations are hazardous. During the symposium colloquy, he discussed the importance of providing for termination since so many alliances do eventually unravel.
The last presentation was my own, which focused on the problems lawyers face because strategic alliances are so different from
the other business transactions they usually handle. 7 First, the
goals of partners vary and may not be apparent to the lawyer.
Second, although partners often shun protracted negotiations and
long, detailed agreements, the lawyer may be blamed if the client
comes to grief because of a gap in the contract. Accordingly, the
lawyer must consult with the client about its goals, its expectations, and its willingness to assume various risks more than in
other deals.
Alliances involve complex situations with great uncertainty
that can never be completely eliminated by a detailed contract, so
the parties must rely more on trust than on legal enforcement of
contract terms. This, too, is unusual and problematic for lawyers.
The role of advocate or hired gun that is instilled in lawyers can
backfire by eroding the trust that is crucial to the success of an alliance. Instead, the lawyer has to strive for win-win solutions to
problems that will please the other party, without neglecting the
needs of the client.
The need of partners to trust and cooperate, often for many
years, means that lawyers face greater difficulties in designing
governance and termination mechanisms and protecting confidential information and property rights from opportunism. For the
same reasons, disagreements are likely to occur, but litigation is
impractical if the alliance is to continue. Therefore, the lawyer
must devise dispute resolution mechanisms that maintain trust and
cooperation. Because alliances are so diverse, lawyers cannot resort to their favorite drafting technique, which is simply to change
7 See George W. Dent, Jr., The Role of Lawyers in Strategic Alliances,
53 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 953 (2003).
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the names from their last deal. Training lawyers to handle these
problems will require major changes in legal education.
Although diversity is often trumpeted as a strength, it is often
to the creation of trust; people tend to trust those who
obstacle
an
are like themselves and to distrust those who are different. Sociologists and psychologists have discussed techniques for overcoming distrust born of diversity, and lawyers need to know these
techniques. However, Professor Sampson noted in later colloquy
that, despite the difficulties of fostering trust between diverse people, alliances of diverse parties often produce superior results.
The first commentator on my presentation was Hewitt Shaw, a
respected tax lawyer. 8 He argued that, despite the need for trust
between allies, efficiency is served when each lawyer zealously
represents his client. However, in so doing a lawyer must act with
more finesse and understanding for the situation than in many
other commercial arrangements. He stressed that often partners
have very different firm cultures. For an alliance to succeed, the
parties and their lawyers must recognize and cope with these differences. The lawyer's instinct to identify questions and nail down
answers is extremely useful in this regard.
Mr. Shaw noted that after a contract is signed, the partners often disregard it; instead, they use the contract as a backup in case
major disputes arise. Nonetheless, the process of reaching agreement is an important step in educating the partners as to what to
expect from the alliance. He stressed that the shorter, less comprehensive contracts that business people often profess to favor
can be both difficult to draft and dangerous in their incompleteness. He advised lawyers to alert their clients to gaps in the agreement.
Shaw reminded us that the trust needed for alliances is not
blind faith. It rests largely on understanding how the partner's
goals coincide with one's own and how they differ. Such a cleareyed understanding is necessary to avoid unrealistic expectations
about one's partner. Shaw also discussed the difficult questions of
loyalty that can arise when a lawyer for one partner is asked to advise management of an alliance while also owing duties to the
other party.
The last commentator in the Symposium was Wendy Shiba, a
former professor of law, who contributed the unique perspective of

8 See Hewitt B.

Shaw, Jr., The Role of Outside Counsel in Forming Strategic Alliances,

53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 965 (2003).
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the in-house counsel. 9 She began by noting that the common comparison of alliances to marriage is problematic because, unlike
spouses, partners often enter an alliance because of their differences and their contrasting strengths, and not because of their
compatibility. She further noted that the design of the alliance depends in part on whether the partners expect to remain separate or
whether they see the alliance as possibility leading to an acquisition.
Ms. Shiba reiterated Steve Fraidin's point that change-incontrol clauses can wreak havoc and therefore should be reviewed
carefully by lawyer and client. Related thereto, she stressed the
importance of due diligence to determine, inter alia, whether the
possible partner has change-in-control or non-competition agreements that might interfere with the proposed alliance. She also
reiterated the importance of fiduciary duties; e.g., clarifying the
fiduciary obligations of employees of a partner who will be directors or agents of the alliance.
Shiba discussed the role of in-house counsel, particularly the importance of maintaining an independent voice, even if it means advising the business people to abandon a deal to which they are emotionally committed. She repeated the importance of getting the lawyer
involved early in the deal and noted that in-house counsel may enjoy
an advantage in that regard. As Jeanne Rickert noted in later colloquy, in-house counsel usually understands the firm's business better
than outside counsel can. Ms. Shiba suggested that outside counsel
should try to learn the client's business by arranging tours and briefings without charge to the client. She also mentioned alternative billing strategies that might benefit both client and lawyer. Finally, she
suggested that business people are becoming disenchanted with complex joint venture arrangements and may be moving to simpler alliances, like licensing agreements.
This Leet Symposium is the first such event in legal academia
to focus on strategic alliances; it certainly will not be the last. The
economic importance of alliances is large and growing rapidly.
Alliances are also increasingly important to lawyers and the law,
but neither lawyers nor legal scholars have adequately addressed
the distinctive problems that alliances create. I hope that this Symposium will ignite an interest in resolving this shortcoming.
GEORGE W. DENT, JR.t
9 See Wendy C. Shiba, Representation of Joint Ventures: A Practical Perspective from
In-House Counsel, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 971 (2003).
t Schott-van den Eynden Professor of Business Organizations Law, School of Law, Case
Western Reserve University.

